股权众筹中介机构的功能解释与立法规制

TheFunctional Interpretation and Legislative RegulationofIntermediary Institutions inEquity Crowdfunding

自Coffee教授《看门人机制:市场中介与公司治理》一书出版发行以来,对证券市场"看门人"失败的反思,尤其是"声誉资本"悖论之现象得到详细描述。公募与私募股权众筹在本质上属于证券发行行为,亦是基于传统证券发行制度的创新,其过程中必然无法避免"看门人"的参与。尽管二者在解决信息不对称问题时具有相同的内在需求,但也因各自面临的核心困境不同,衍生出两套相似但有区别的规则体系。因而需从新型中介(顾问、信息整合者、精明的读者)角度,对应对信息不对称工具(信息披露、群体智慧、信用中介)的功能重新进行解释。在构建我国股权众筹"看门人"制度时,应厘清二者规则设计的逻辑基础,不可将其作为通用制度概而论之。

Since professor Coffee published his book Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance,thequestions about the function of the Gatekeeper, especially the paradox of Reputation Capital, have been described from multiple perspectives.In essence, Retail Crowdfunding and Accredited Crowdfundingbothare innovations based on the traditional securities issuance system,and Gatekeepers are alsoinevitablein the process. Due to different core dilemmas, they derive two sets of similar but different rule systems, although they face the same internal requirements in solving the Information Asymmetry problem. Therefore,the functions of tools to solve Information Asymmetry(Information Disclosure, Group Intelligence, Credit Intermediary) should be reinterpretedfrom the perspective of new intermediaries(Consultants, Information Integrators, Smart Readers). When constructing the Gatekeeper system of EquityCrowdfunding in China, we should clarify the logical basis of their rule design and should not confusethemwith each other.