超越宣告性模式和判决主义模式——麦考密克对“法律推理和法律理论”的重新思考

Transcending the Declaratory Model and the Decisionist Model: Neil MacCormick's Second Thoughts on Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory

本文对麦考密克的法律理论和法律论证理论提供一种历时性重构,尤其强调两个相关要点;这两个要点力图揭示出《法律推理与法律理论》中的观点与麦考密克后期作品所特别强调的观点之间的差异性。第一个要点关涉麦考密克对法律实证主义的渐进性断裂,更确切地说,是这样一个命题:"对法律正义的隐性要求"证明了法律实证主义在其所有的不同版本中都是虚假的。第二个要点关涉麦考密克对"唯一正确答案"这个命题的接受性,以及在结果上淡化麦考密克、罗纳德·德沃金和罗伯特·阿列克西等人的法律推理理论之间的不同之处。但是,本文的意图不仅是描述麦考密克思想中的这一变化,而且尝试对我们在《法律推理与法律理论》中所发现的原初观点进行一种辩护。

This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick’s theory of law and legal argumentation: In particular, two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked. The rst point concerns MacCormick’s gradual break with legal positivism, and more speci?cally the thesis that the implicit pretension to justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions. The second point concerns MacCormick’s acceptance of the one-right-answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy. The intent, however, is not only to describe this change in MacCormick’s thought, but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we nd in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory.