指示、谓述和宽辖域

Designation, Predication and Widescopism

本文先简要分析名称和限定摹状词的指示性用法和谓述性用法,并就克里普克的严格性论题的宽辖域论和严格化描述论进行反驳,然后通过指示性/谓述性区分和宽/窄辖域区分表明,卡普兰在反驳宽辖域论时犯了一个关键性错误:在假设名称与相应的摹状词同义后,仍然允许名称和相应的摹状词在两者都出现的语境中有不同的用法,因而指称不同的对象。

This paper briefly argues for the distinction of designative and predicative uses of names and definite descriptions in natural language, and outlines widescopist and rigidified descriptivist objections to Kripke’s rigidity theses. By appealing to the distinctions of designative/predicative use and wide/narrow scope, it shows that in his arguments against widescopism Caplan commits a crucial fallacy: after supposing a name is synonymous with its corresponding description, he still permits the name and its relevant description not to co-refer in a context where they both occur.