高管薪酬差距、股权集中度与企业绩效——基于企业产权异质性的视角

Executive Pay Gap,Equity Concentration and Corporate Performance:From the Perspective of Heterogeneity of Corporate Property Rights

以企业的产权异质性为研究视角,选取2012—2016年沪深A股的年度数据,探索高管薪酬差距、股权集中度和企业绩效三者关系的传导机制,分别验证在企业产权异质性下,股权集中度对高管薪酬差距与企业绩效的作用。研究发现:高管薪酬差距所形成的激励作用能够正向影响企业的绩效,却与企业的产权异质无关。但是,在企业产权异质性的影响下,股权集中度对高管薪酬差距与企业绩效的调节作用却表现出较大的差异。特别是在国有企业中,股权集中度负向调节高管薪酬差距与企业绩效之间的关系,而在非国有企业中这种关系却不显著。

This paper takes the heterogeneity of property rights of enterprises as the research perspective, selects the annual data of Shanghai-Shenzhen A-shares from 2012 to 2016, and explores the transmission mechanism of the relationship between executive compensation gap, equity concentration and corporate performance, to verify the effect of equity concentration on executive pay gap and corporate performance respectively under the heterogeneity of property rights. We find that the incentive effect formed by the executive pay gap can positively affect the performance of the enterprise, but the effect has nothing to do with the heterogeneity of the property rights of the enterprise. However, under the influence of the heterogeneity of corporate property rights, the adjustment effect of equity concentration on executive pay gap and corporate performance shows a big difference. In particular, in state-owned enterprises, equity concentration negatively regulates the relationship between executive pay gaps and corporate performance, while in non-state-owned enterprises this relationship is not significant.