基于策略消费者行为的最低团购数量决策

Minimum Quantity Decision of Group-Purchase in the Presence of Strategic Consumers

考虑短视消费者和策略消费者并存的市场中,策略消费者所占的比例对厂商决策的影响。在市场需求与消费者对产品估价均为随机变量情况下,建立厂商最低团购数量和消费者临界评价值的理性预期均衡模型,研究厂商如何制定合适的最低团购数量以应对策略消费者的持币观望行为,指出厂商团购限量策略的适用范围,并与不限量的厂商决策进行比较。结果表明:策略消费者的比例对厂商的影响与团购价格折扣率的大小有关,厂商采取限量策略时的利润大于不限量策略时的利润,忽略策略消费者的存在会对厂商利润造成较大的损失。最后,以旅游团购为例证明了本文模型的合理性和实用性。

The influences of the fraction of strategic consumers on the decisions of firms were analyzed in a market containing both strategic and myopic consumers. The model in which the manufacturer's minimum bulk quantity and consumers' critical value were rational expectations was established where the market demand and consumers' valuation were both random variables. The minimum quantity of grouppurchase was studied to deal with consumers' behavior of staying on the sidelines. The scope of limited strategy was pointed out and compared with unlimited decision. The results show that the influences of the fraction of strategic consumers on the decisions of firms are related to the group price discount rate. The manufacturer's profit in limited strategy is better than that in unlimited strategy. Finally, an example of tourism group purchase is given to verify the rationality and effectiveness of the model.