延迟支付下供应链的运作机制及协调策略

Mechanism and Coordination of Supply Chain Under Delayed Payment

研究了延期支付下供应链的运作机制及协调性问题。研究表明,在分散决策的情况下,存在唯一的纳什均衡,尽管零售商在订货上表现得更加积极,但仍然低于集中决策下的最优成交量;零售商满足无资金约束所需最小资金量会增加;供应商更倾向于选择更小资金量的零售商,来达到提高期望利润的目的,但这种行为会导致偏离系统的最优状态。在协调方面通过引入回购合同,在某种程度上缓解了零售商的资金约束,同时使得供应链达到协调。

This paper discusses the operational mechanism and coordination of supply chain under delayed payment. Studies indicate that a unique NASH equilibrium exists in decentralized decision-making, in which the order quantity is below that of the centralized system despite of aggression of the retailer in ordering. The minimum amount of money required for retailers to meet unfunded constraints will increase. Suppliers are more likely to choose retailers with smaller amounts of money to achieve the desired profit, but such behaviour can lead to deviations from the optimal state of the system. In coordination, by introducing a buy-back contract, the retailer’s financial constraints are alleviated to some extent, and the supply chain is coordinated.