摘要
为了解决大用户直购电与风电消纳之间的矛盾,文章提出利用大用户以直购电的形式消纳风电。首先,以上下旋转备用来应对风电的不确定性,引入储能系统弥补较高备用需求导致的上下旋转备用空间的不足。其次,在此基础上以大用户直购电背景下风电最优并网容量为目标建立了以发电企业为领导者,风电场为跟随者的主从博弈模型。最后,运用改进粒子群算法在含风电场的IEEE 30节点系统上进行仿真分析,算例验证了所提方法的有效性。
In order to solve the contradiction between direct power purchase and wind power consumption,large consumers may contribute to wind power accommodation by direct power purchasing as proposed in this paper,upper and lower spinning reserves are used to deal with the uncertainty of wind power,and the energy storage system is introduced to make up for the shortage of spinning reserve caused by higher demand. A Stackelberg Game model is established aiming at the optimal capacity of wind power integration in the context of direct power purchase by large consumers. The model takes power generation companies as leaders and wind farms as followers. Finally,the improved particle swarm optimization algorithm is applied in simulation analysis on the IEEE 30-node system with wind farm. Case study shows that the proposed method is valid.
作者
邓强
詹红霞
杨孝华
梅哲
张豪
朱金龙
DENG Qiang;ZHAN Hongxia;YANG Xiaohua;MEI Zhe;ZHANG Hao;ZHU Jinlong(School of Electrical Engineering and Electronic Information, Xihua University, Chengdu 610039, China;Yunyang Power Supply Company of Chongqing Electric Power Company, Chongqing 404500, China)
出处
《电力建设》
北大核心
2019年第4期98-109,共12页
Electric Power Construction
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(51877181)
四川省教育厅项目(18ZB0566)~~
关键词
大用户直购电
旋转备用
储能系统
风电不确定性
风电消纳
主从博弈
direct power purchase by large consumers
spinning reserve
energy storage system
wind power uncertainty
wind power accommodation
Stackelberg game