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虚拟经济泡沫风险、管理者风险偏好与企业投资效率 被引量:1

Fictitious Economic Bubble Risk, Managers' Risk Preference and Investment Efficiency
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摘要 本文采用理论与实证相结合的方法,研究了虚拟经济泡沫风险、管理者风险偏好对企业投资效率的影响。研究结果表明,虚拟经济泡沫风险较小,会降低企业非效率投资;管理者风险偏好与非效率投资正相关,即管理者越偏好风险,企业非效率投资越严重,但研究发现,管理风险偏好者对虚拟经济泡沫风险具有显著敏感性,即在虚拟经济泡沫风险下,较高水平的管理风险偏好能够显著改善虚拟经济泡沫风险所导致的非效率投资。 In the generalized virtual economy, which is mainly to meet the consumer’s psychological needs, the marketing mode of the enterprise has changed dramatically, and cause-related marketing, as a new marketing method, came into being in order to meet the consumer’s appeal to the enterprise to fulfill the social responsibility. Based on the long panel data of automobile listed companies from 2001 to 2016, this paper empirically studies the influence of cause-related marketing on the profitability of automobile enterprises. The results show that the profitability of automobile enterprises is related to cause-related marketing, the scale of cause-related marketing has a significantly positive effect on the profitability.
作者 王元月 周婧琳 成哲 WANG Yuan-yue;ZHOU Jing-lin;CHENG Zhe(School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China)
出处 《广义虚拟经济研究》 2019年第1期52-60,共9页 Research on the Generalized Virtual Economy
基金 广义虚拟经济研究专项资助项目[项目编号:GX2015-1010(Y)]
关键词 虚拟经济泡沫风险 管理者风险偏好 企业非效率投资 fictitious economic bubble risk managers’ risk preference inefficient corporate investment
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