独立分析师与关联分析师的相互作用

Interaction between Independent Analysts and Affiliated Analysts

采用2008—2016年分析师对上市公司的预测意见作为研究样本,检验资本市场上关联分析师与独立分析师行为的相互作用。实证研究结果表明:独立分析师对关联分析师的乐观偏差存在约束效应,当与关联分析师跟踪同一上市公司的独立分析师比重提高时,关联分析师预测的乐观偏差降低同时预测准确度提高;然而,受利益冲突影响,关联分析师的信息优势没有得到充分体现,整体没有取得更好的预测表现,只有在目标公司信息高度不对称时,关联分析师才具有更好的预测准确度表现,独立分析师对关联分析师总体上未表现出追随倾向。

With the analysts’ forecasts for listed companies from 2008 to 2016 as the research sample, this paper examines the interaction between affiliated analysts and independent ones in capital market. Empirical research suggests that independent analysts restrain the optimistic deviations caused by affiliated analysts, and when more independent analysts follow the same listed company as affiliated analysts do, affiliated analysts show a decrease in optimistic deviations but an increase in accuracy of forecast. However, the information advantage of affiliated analysts does not exert itself due to the impact of conflicts of interest, and they fail to realize better forecasts. Only when the information of the target company is highly asymmetric can affiliated analysts make more accurate forecasts. In general, independent analysts have no tendency of following affiliated analysts.