研发众包最优投标和激励策略研究——基于逆向拍卖理论

Research on the Bidding and Rewards Allocation Strategy of Creative Crowdsourcing Contest——Based on Reverse Auction Theory

运用逆向拍卖理论,研究研发众包竞赛中最优投标策略和奖金分配机制。构建了众包接包方和发包方效用函数,以及众包接包方最优投标模型和奖金分配模型,得到了投标策略存在唯一对称的贝叶斯纳什均衡,分析了接包方的研发努力成本参数、投标人数对投标决策的影响,讨论了发包方的奖金分配策略。研究表明,均衡的投标策略可使接包方的效用最大,众包参与人数、平台佣金率、接包方的研发努力成本参数等都对最优投标策略产生影响;当接包方的成本函数为线性函数和凹函数时,发包方最优的奖金分配策略是第一名胜出者得到所有奖金;但当接包方的成本函数为凸函数时,第一名获得所有奖金的方式不一定是最优的。

This paper explores the optimal strategies of bidding and rewards allocation in reverse auction theory.First,it establishes utility function both the contestant and the organizer.An optimal bidding model for crowdsourcing is established,and it is proved that there is a unique symmetric Bias Nash equilibrium.Then the expected quality of creative solutions is built.Further,the study discusses the influence of number of participants and creative effort cost parameter on bidding decision.The rewards allocation of organizer is also studied.The research shows that:For the contestant,there is a balanced bidding strategy to maximize benefits,and the number of contest participants,the commission rate,the cost parameter of the contestants will influence the optimal bidding decision.For the crowdsourcing sponsor,when the cost functions of the contestant is linear or concave,the best allocation strategy that the first participants obtains all rewards;but when the cost functions of the contestants are convex,several prizes may be optimal.