银行与民营企业融资救助:救助门槛与民营企业风险偏好

Bank and Financing Rescue for Private Enterprise:Rescue Threshold and Risk Bias of Private Enterprise

本文就救助门槛对民营企业风险偏好的影响进行了分析,得到了以下研究结论:(1)救助门槛的形成在于银行的避险理性所致;因民营企业倒闭而使银行承受的成本越高,则救助门槛越高;民营企业信息透明程度越高,则救助门槛越低。(2)救助门槛对民营企业风险偏好的影响表现为:首先,当不存在救助门槛约束时,民营企业会偏好高风险;其次,当存在救助门槛约束时,救助门槛越高,则民营企业风险偏好越低。本文的研究表明,为了防范区域金融危机的发生,对民营企业的救助应坚持市场化方向,政府不能人为降低商业银行的救助门槛;同时,为了激励银行对陷入困境中的民营企业进行融资救助,除了降低商业银行的救助成本外,政府自身与政策性金融机构应承担相应的救助责任。

This paper analyzes the impact of the threshold of rescue on the risk bias of private enterprises,and has obtained the following research conclusions.(1) The formation of the rescue threshold is caused by the bank's risk aversion rationality;the higher the cost of the bank due to the collapse of the private enterprise,the higher the thresh- old for rescue;the higher the transparency of private enterprise information,the lower the threshold for rescue.(2) The impacts of the rescue threshold on the risk bias of private enterprises are as follows. Firstly,when there is no barri- er to rescue,private enterprises will be biased towards high risks;secondly,when there is a rescue threshold,the higher the threshold for rescue,the lower the risk bias of private enterprises. The research shows that in order to pre- vent the occurrence of regional financial crisis,the rescue of private enterprises should adhere to the direction of mar- ketization,and the government can not artificially lower the threshold for the rescue of commercial banks.At the same time,in order to encourage banks to finance the troubled private enterprises,in addition to reducing the cost of relief for commercial banks,the government itself and policy financial institutions should bear the corresponding responsibil- ity for assistance.