基于供应链视角的大型零售商与供应商竞合机制——一个博弈模型的分析

A Game Model Analysis of Coopetition Mechanism between Large Retailers and Suppliers:A Supply Chain Perspective

从供应链企业之间如何保持稳定的合作关系入手,基于供应链上大型零售商与供应商之间如何打造稳定的竞合关系进行文献分析的基础上,建立了大型零售商与供应商之间的两阶段竞争博弈模型,研究发现:由于大型零售商和供应商本身存在短期利益追求和有效信任机制缺乏现象,使得供零双方均会出现背弃承诺而使得合作关系不稳定,而关系资本和违约赔偿支付金是实现供零双方信任机制得以提升并实现稳定合作的关键所在,两者共同维护供应链上大型零售商与供应商之间合作的稳定,且关系资本投入与违约支付金支付两者之间存在显著的替代效应。因此,在实践中,基于供应链的大型零售商与供应商之间应该通过加大供零双方关系资本的共同投入和违约金支付来保障供应链上下游企业合作的稳定。

Starting from maintaining a stable cooperative relationship between supply chain enterprises and based on reviewing the literatures on how to build stable coopetition relationships between large retailers and suppliers,this paper established a two-stage competition game model between large retailers and suppliers,and through analysis,found that due to the pursuit of short-term interests and lack of effective trust mechanism between the large retailers and suppliers,the cooperation between the suppliers and retailers is unstable because both parties may renege on their commitments;relationship capital and penalty for breach of contract are the key to enhance the trust between the two and realize their stable cooperation;the two should jointly maintain the stability of their cooperative relationship in the supply chain;and there is significant substitution effect between relationship capital and penalty for breach of contract.Therefore,in practice,the large retailers and suppliers in the supply chain should ensure the stability of the cooperation between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain by jointly investing in relationship capital and instituting the penalty for breach of contract.