管理层自利与企业内部控制缺陷模仿披露关系研究——基于制度理论分析

Research on the Relationship between Management Self-interest and the Imitation Behavior of Corporate Internal Control Weaknesses Disclosure——Analysis based on institutional theory

内部控制缺陷披露是管理层向外部释放企业内部控制水平和会计信息质量的重要信号,受到利益相关者的高度关注。以往文献大多基于信息不对称和代理理论研究内部控制缺陷披露。本文从制度理论视角,研究管理层自利与企业内部控制缺陷模仿披露的关系。研究发现:在内部控制披露合法性压力和不确定性条件下,管理层基于自利偏好于模仿披露内部控制缺陷;进一步发现,资本市场和监管机构能够识别存在缺陷却不披露的行为,但对于模仿披露行为并不能够准确识别,揭示了面对合法性压力和不确定性,管理层基于自利而模仿披露内部控制缺陷可能是一种不规范披露行为。研究结果对于优化我国企业内部控制有重要政策启示。

Disclosure of internal control weaknesses is an important signal of the level of internal control and the quality of accounting information that management release to the outside world. Most previous literature studied the disclosure of internal control weaknesses based on information asymmetry and agency theory. Based on institutional theory, This paper investigates the relationship between management self-interest and decision? making behavior of internal control weaknesses imitative disclosure. It is found that, under the pressure of legality and the uncertainty of internal control weaknesses disclosure, management prefers to imitate disclosure the internal control weaknesses based on self-interest. Capital market and regulators can identify no disclose, however, the imitative behavior of internal control weaknesses disclosure cannot be identified accurately. It reveals that the imitative behavior of internal control weaknesses disclosure may be a kind of irregular disclosure behavior.