分化的精英:纠纷解决中的下海官员和参政商人

Differentiation of the Elite: Xiahai and canzheng Entrepreneurs in Dispute Resolution

在中国的市场转型争论中,"下海"官员和参政商人身上体现了企业主政治纽带及从政经历的不同方式。本文聚焦于这些分化的精英,利用2006年中国私营企业主抽样调查数据,根据私营企业主创业前后获得政治资本的不同方式,将其细分为"下海"官员、"草根参政"商人和"下海参政"商人,并将纠纷类别分为管理纠纷和经济纠纷。结果发现,与经济纠纷相比,私营企业主更少选择跟管理部门打管理纠纷官司;当前拥有政治资本的企业家会更倾向于以组织内途径解决管理纠纷,而没有政治参与的"下海"官员更倾向于以个体途径及法律途径解决经济纠纷,甚至采取反抗的途径解决管理纠纷;在控制了企业规模和教育程度后,影响私营企业主运用法律途径解决经济纠纷的并非政治资本,而是主观认同和过去的经历。

In the debate of China s market transition, xiahai entrepreneurs and canzheng entrepreneurs represent business elites with different political connections and experiences in politics. This article uses data from the 2006 Chinese Private Entrepreneurs Survey to construct dispute resolution models for entrepreneurs. We introduce three types of entrepreneurs who have shown different characteristics as political elites. The xiahai canzheng entrepreneurs and caogen canzheng entrepreneurs tend to rely on institutions such as the government and associations to resolve disputes. The xiahai entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are inclined to rely on personal channels, or even contentious methods to settle disputes outside the institution. Controlling the size of enterprises and educations levels, what affects whether the entrepreneurs settle disputes through legal means are their subjective values and past experiences, rather than political capital.