财政支出竞争、城投债发行与城市经济增长——基于财政支出压力视角

Fiscal Expenditure Competition, Urban Investment Debt and Urban Economic Growth:From the Perspective of Fiscal Expenditure Pressure

本文使用2008～2016年中国286个地级市的面板数据,运用面板分位数模型实证分析了财政支出竞争对城市经济增长的影响。研究表明:财政支出竞争显著促进了城市经济增长,且这种促进作用在发达地区更为明显;城投债发行是财政支出竞争促进城市经济增长的重要传导渠道;特大城市的财政支出竞争对城市经济增长的促进作用比大城市更加明显;非社会性支出竞争比社会性支出竞争对城市经济增长具有更强的拉动作用;官员变更在财政支出竞争对城市经济增长的影响方面产生了重要的调节效应,其中发生市委书记变更、市委书记和市长同时变更的城市均削弱了财政支出竞争对城市经济增长的促进作用,而发生市长变更的城市则无影响。

Based on panel data of 286 prefecture-level cities in China from 2008 to 2016,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of fiscal expenditure competition on urban economic growth using panel quantile model. The result shows that: Fiscal expenditure competition significantly promoted urban economic growth, and this promotion effect is more obvious in developed regions;The issuance of urban investment bonds is an important transmission channel for fiscal expenditure competition to promote urban economic growth;The role of fiscal expenditure competition in megacities is more obvious than that of large cities;non-social expenditure competition is more effective in promoting economic growth than social expenditure competition. Officials' changes have had an important regulatory effect on the impact of fiscal expenditure competition on urban economic growth. Among them, cities with changes in municipal party committees and the municipal party committees with mayor changes in the same time have weakened the role of fiscal expenditure competition in promoting economic growth, and there is no effect in the city of changes in the mayor.