否定与自由:黑格尔与费希特论否定的行动性

Negativity as freedom: The theory of negative activity by Hegel and Fichte

在《逻辑学》中,黑格尔以假象概念作为存在逻辑与本质逻辑之间的过渡概念。在本质逻辑部分的开篇,通过构造假象概念的直接性这一悖谬,黑格尔成功地将否定性概念引入了对本质概念的分析之中,并在此基础上以行动性的方式确立了本质概念的否定性自我关联。本文将在黑格尔与费希特的理论哲学背景下,通过对这两个论证步骤的分析,说明无论是费希特还是黑格尔都将自由的行动性奠基于绝对否定性概念之上。绝对否定性概念克服了所予的直接性,并直接指向了绝对自由。

The concept of “shine” serves as the bridge between the “logic of being” and the “logic of essence” in Hegel s Science of Logic (1812/16). Right at the beginning of the logic of essence, Hegel attempts to introduce the concept of negativity into the analysis of the concept of essence throughout constituting the antinomy of the “immediacy of the concept of shine”. Starting from this standpoint, Hegel establishes a negative self-reference of the concept of essence with the absolute activity. By analyzing these two argumentative steps within the theoretical context of Hegel as well as Fichte, this paper aims to clarify that these two philosophical figures have postulated the absolute negativity as the foundation of a free activity, which is the highest principle of transcendental philosophy. Therefore, the absolute negativity could overcome the immediacy of “the given”, and directs itself towards the absolute freedom.