存款保险制度能否防范银行的系统性风险——基于Panel-Logit模型的实证检验

Can the Deposit Insurance System Prevent the Bank Systemic Risk——An empirical test based on the Panel-Logit model

以全球76个样本国家的数据为基础,通过构建Panel-Logit模型研究存款保险制度与银行系统性风险之间的关系。研究结果显示:利率的市场化改革会加剧银行系统的不稳定,此时建立存款保险制度可以降低银行系统性风险的发生概率,但整体效果不够显著,而且利率市场化完成后,存款保险制度的金融稳定效果还将下降;银行监管制度的强化有助于防范系统性风险的发生,同时与存款保险制度配套使用时,能够一起构成现代金融安全网,显著提升存款保险制度的金融稳定效果;在存款保险制度的具体内容设计中,存款保险机构较强的独立性与监管职能、存款人共同参与保险以及风险调整费率等有助于降低银行系统性风险的发生概率。

Based on the data of 76 sample countries around the world, this paper studies the relationship between the deposit insurance system and the bank systemic risk of the bank by constructing the Panel-Logit model. The result shows that: the market-oriented reform of interest rates will aggravate the instability of the banking system. Then the establishment of deposit insurance system can reduce the probability of bank systemic risk, but the effect is not significant enough. After the completion of interest rate marketization, the financial stability effect of the deposit insurance system will also decline. The strengthening of banking supervision helps to prevent the occurrence of systemic risks. At the same time, when combined with the deposit insurance system, it can form a modern financial safety net and significantly improve the financial stability of the deposit insurance system. In the designing of the deposit insurance system, the stronger independence and regulatory functions of deposit insurance institutions, the depositors’ participation in insurance, and the risk-adjusted rates will help to reduce the probability of bank systemic risk.