双边冲突的理论与实践

Bilateral Conflicts:Theory and Applications

一个更加激进的对外冲突将攫取更多的贸易利益,却会对自身经济发展带来损害。本文在博弈论的框架下尝试研究两个国家之间对外政策的最优冲突程度。通过建立一个简单的抽象模型分析我们发现,一个国家愿意施行的对外最优冲突程度并不是另一国冲突程度的单调函数,而是遵循着先升后降的规律,两国之间有且仅有一个稳定的均衡冲突程度。并且,随着外国经济实力增长,本国的均衡对外冲突程度将单调递增;而随着自身综合实力增长,本国均衡对外冲突程度呈现出先降后升的前期"韬光养晦"而后期"厚积薄发"策略。因此,双边关系一般会呈现出五个阶段,随着两国总体实力对比的变化与两国总体实力发展速度对比的变化而演变出不同的趋势,其中均衡中高速发展的小国倾向于选择越来越平和的对外政策,大国则倾向于选择越来越激进的对外政策。我们还将理论带入到中美、中印以及中日双边关系从1960年到2015年的演化过程,认为中美关系在从第二阶段向第三阶段过渡,中印关系已经从第三阶段进入第四阶段,而中日关系已经从第二阶段进入第三阶段,故而中美与中日关系趋向于恶化,而中印关系趋向于震荡上升。

A more aggressive unilateral diplomatic policy could gain more trade benefit,at the cost of slowing down development. This paper established a two-country game theory framework aiming at solving for the optimal diplomatic policy. With the help of a reduced form model,we find the optimal unilateral aggressiveness appears not monotonic regarding to the other country's policy,but an inverse-U shape instead. There exists a stable and unique Nash equilibrium, where home's conflict policy keeps leveling up as foreign grows,but demonstrates a U shape corresponding to own development,rationalizing the necessity of adopting low profile for small countries. In equilibrium,bilateral relationship generally represents five stages,decided by relative level and relative growth ratio of national strength. When model is brought into discussion upon the evolution of bilateral relationship regarding China-US,China-India and China- Japan from 1960 to 2015,we think China-US relationship is stepping into the third stage,and China-India relationship has already been in the fourth stage,while China-Japan is in the third now. Thus we can expect the deterioration of China-US and China-Japan relationship and a spiraling up of China-India relationship in the near future.