先验生活之可怖——《自我的超越性》和《想象物》中的“自发性”问题

The Monstrosity of Transcendental Life: The Question of Spontaneity in La Transcendance de l’ Ego and L’ imaginaire

意识之自发性乃是贯穿于萨特早期哲学工作的核心问题。通过认定意识之自发本性,萨特相继在《自我的超越性》和《想象物》中得出"意识无自我"和"想象即自由"这两条著名命题。然而,对于自发性的讨论毕竟只隶属于先验论的工作范围,而萨特哲学之立意从一开始就指向了溢出纯粹先验论场域的超越论部分,并且正是在此立意的指引之下,萨特在构造以自发性现象学为实质内涵的先验论的同时,反过来标示出了先验意识由其自发本性而导致的对于自身的囚禁,后者尤其体现在在萨特看来实为对意识自发本性之本质洞察的病态意识体验之中。本文试图就透露在萨特早期文本中的这些问题作出梳理。

The spontaneity of consciousness is essential to Sartre s early philosophy.It is through a clarification of this notion that Sartre, in La Transcendance de l 'Ego and L' imaginaire , argues respectively for the non-egological nature of consciousness and the equivalence between freedom and imagination.Meanwhile, the discussion of spontaneity being after all a transcendental work, Sartre s philosophical enterprise is by no means reducible to this work since from its very beginning, it constructs itself as a philosophy of transcendence and that s the reason why, while proposing a transcendental philosophy whose very nature is a phenomenology of spontaneity, Sartre insists nevertheless on the fact that transcendental consciousness, which follows no rules but those of its own spontaneity, would be captured by itself and it is precisely what happens to the so-called pathological consciousness, no matter how much the latter reveals the spontaneous nature of consciousness in general.