自然产权、能力异质性与第三方力量

Natural Property Rights, Capability Heterogeneity and Third-Party Forces

本文对演化博弈学派的理论与模型进行拓展,发现建立在禀赋效应上的自然产权秩序存在不稳定性。本文重新构建演化博弈模型,引入现实中的能力限制与异质性。在能力异质性条件下,第三方力量对强势个体的抑制和对弱势个体的保护有助于形成稳定的产权秩序。强弱个体发展出统治与服从这一特殊的合作形式,可以内生出第三方力量并建立稳定的产权秩序,从而推动人类文明的生成和发展。在能力限制与异质性条件下,多个第三方力量的演变既可能产生更高层级的第三方力量归于一统,也可能陷入均势。

Based on the theory and model of the evolutionary game school, this paper develops and demonstrates that the order of natural property rights based on the endowment effect may become unstable;it reconstructs an evolutionary game model, introducing real-world capability constraints and heterogeneity.The suppression of strong individuals and the protection of vulnerable individuals by third-party forces contributes to the formation of a stable property rights order.Strong and weak individuals develop a cooperative form of governance and obedience, which can generate third-party forces internally and establish a stable property rights order, thus promoting the generation and development of human civilisation.Under the condition of capability constraints and heterogeneity, the evolution of multiple third-party forces may either lead to a higher level of third-party forces or their downfall into a balance of power.