考虑配电网安全性的虚拟电厂优化调度博弈模型

Optimal dispatch game model for virtual power plant considering security of distribution network

以往的虚拟电厂(VPP)优化调度模型仅考虑VPP的经济性,所得最优调度方案往往无法满足配电网的安全需求,会造成线路过负荷、节点电压越限等问题,影响电力系统的安全稳定运行。为了权衡VPP的经济性与配电网的安全性,建立了基于非合作博弈理论的VPP优化调度博弈模型,并且采用随机规划法处理风/光可再生能源以及电价的不确定性。以某市城北变八引线配电网为算例,对VPP优化调度模型、配电网安全性模型以及非合作博弈模型三者的优化结果进行了比较,结果表明:当VPP与配电网以非合作方式进行博弈时,会采取相对保守的调度策略,削减各聚合单元的发电量,使VPP在获得较大利润的同时,配电网也能够保持较高的安全性,验证了所提非合作博弈模型的有效性和合理性。

The previous optimal dispatch models of VPP(Virtual Power Plant) only consider the economy of VPP and the obtained optimal dispatch schemes often fail to meet the security requirements of the distribution network, which may cause the problems of line over-load, node voltage over-limit and so on and affect the safe and stable ope-ration of the power system. In order to balance the economy of VPP and the security of distribution network, an optimal dispatch game model of VPP based on non-cooperative game theory is established and the stochastic programming method is applied to deal with the uncertainties of electricity price and renewable energy sources, such as wind power and photovoltaic power. The optimal results of optimal dispatch model of VPP, security model of distribution network and non-cooperative game model are compared based on the case of an eight-lead distribution network in the north of a city. The results show that, when VPP and distribution network play game in a non-cooperative way, the VPP will take a relatively conservative dispatch scheme by reducing the power generation of each aggregation unit, which will increase the profits of VPP and maintain high security of distribution network, verifying the validity and rationality of the proposed non-cooperative game model.