会计师事务所经历的独董在公司盈余管理中的作用——监督抑或咨询?

The role of independent directors with auditing experience in earnings management——Supervision or advising?

基于独董的监督和咨询两大职能,本文探讨了公司盈余管理与会计师事务所经历独董的关系。研究发现:(1)盈余管理程度高的公司更倾向选聘具有事务所经历的独董;(2)盈余管理程度高的公司聘请有事务所经历的独董会向其支付更多的薪酬并且更有可能指定其担任审计委员会主任;(3)盈余管理与有事务所经历的独董的关系在非国有企业、位于较高市场化进程地区、代理成本较高以及管理层权力较大的企业中更显著。本文研究结果表明具有事务所经历的独董在盈余质量较差的公司中发挥了“咨询”功能,有助于学术界和实务界进一步认识独董背景特征在资本市场上的作用,也为完善相关公司治理制度提供了重要的经验和启示。

Based on the two functions of supervision and advising of independent directors, this paper explores the relationship between earnings management and the auditing experience of independent directors. This paper finds that:(l)companies with earnings management are more likely to hire independent directors with auditing experience;(2)when companies with a high degree earnings management hire independent directors with firm experience, these companies are more likely to pay them more bonus and to appoint them as directors of audit committees;(3) earnings management has a more significant relationship with the independent directors with auditing experience in private companies, companies located in higher degree market area, companies with higher agency costs and companies where manager possess higher power. These results show that the independent directors with auditing experience play a "advising" role in companies with poor earnings quality, which helps academia and practitioners to further understand the role of the background of the independent directors in the capital market, as well as shed light on improving the relevant corporate governance system.