基于博弈论的街区开放补贴研究

Research on Block Open Subsidy Based on Game Theory

电子商务的高速发展拉动了物流行业的快速发展,快递行业的急速扩张也带来了一系列如"最后一公里"配送难等问题,封闭街区阻碍了线下资源的流通,在此背景下,我国提出推广街区制。文章尝试建立政府与开发商之间的博弈模型,分析开放型街区在发展过程中政府与开发商就补贴问题而进行的博弈,分析结果表明,开发能力不同的开发商在获取补贴时采取的策略不同,信息不透明增加了开发商投机行为的可能性,不利于开放型街区的建设。针对研究结果,为开放型街区的建设提出了建议。

The rapid development of E-commerce has driven the rapid development of the logistics industry. The rapid expansion of the express delivery industry has also brought a series of problems such as"last mile"distribution difficulties. Closed blocks have hindered the circulation of offline resources. Next, China proposes to promote the block system. This paper attempts to establish a game model between the government and the developer, and analyzes the game between the government and the developer on the subsidy issue during the development of the open block. The analysis shows that the developers with different development capabilities take the strategy when obtaining subsidies. Different, information opacity increases the possibility of speculation by developers, which is not conducive to the construction of open blocks. Based on the research results, suggestions were made for the construction of open blocks.