维特根斯坦论颜色现象学语言

Wittgenstein on Phenomenological Language of Colour

《逻辑哲学论》系统由于其先天分析的设定无法解决颜色不兼容性问题,这导致了维特根斯坦转向现象学时期的研究,他试图通过构建一种可作出后天分析判断的颜色现象学语言来作为《逻辑哲学论》系统的补充来解决这一问题。但是最终维特根斯坦意识到现象学即是语法,从而开始了向后期思想的转向。在20年后的《论颜色》中维特根斯坦说明了实际上并不存在现象学,存在的对现象学问题的考察实际上是一种概念分析,是语言实际用法的考察的一部分。对语言实际用法的概念考察是任何一种理想语言构建所不能忽视的必要因素。

As a result of the analytic a priori hypothesis,the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus system can not handle the colour incompatibility problem.Wittgenstein startes his short phenomenological phrase and tries to construct a phenomenological language of colour,which can be used to assert analytic a posteriori judgement to complemen Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus system.However,Wittgenstein finally realizes that phenomenology is grammar,and begins to evolve his thought.In Remarks on Colour 20 years later,Wittgenstein exposes that there is no phenomenology and the research on phenomenological problems is a kind of conceptual analysis and a part of the research on actual usage of language.The conceptual analysis of actual use of language is a necessary element in the construction of any ideal language.