非关联担保与股价崩盘

Non-connected Guarantees and Stock Price Crash Risk

在当前股市波动性较强的现实困境下,本文主要探讨非关联担保对上市公司股价崩盘风险的影响及作用机制。研究发现,进行非关联担保的上市公司未来一年的股价崩盘风险更高。进一步区分公司治理异质性发现,非关联担保加剧股价崩盘风险的原因在于薄弱的公司治理机制。当上市公司的独立董事监督有效时,非关联担保不会影响上市公司的股价崩盘风险;当上市公司存在较为健全的股权制衡时,非关联担保与股价崩盘风险的联系也相应较弱。本文不仅为规范上市公司担保、防范股价剧烈波动提供了借鉴,也为健全公司治理和防范系统性风险提供了依据。

In the current situation of stock market volatility, this study mainly discusses the impact of non-connected guarantees on the stock price crash risk of listed companies. Our results suggest that listed companies with non-connected guarantees have a significantly higher stock price crash risk in the next year. Furthermore, we find that the weak corporate governance mechanism is the reason on the positive relation between non-connected guarantees and stock price crash risk. In the sample of strong mechanism on effective supervision by independent directors, non-connected guarantees behavior will not significantly affect the stock price crash risk. In addition, when listed companies have relatively sound equity balances, the relationship between non-associated guarantees and stock price collapse risks is also weak.This study not only provides a reference for standardizing the guarantee of listed companies and preventing the sharp rise and fall of stock prices, but also provides evidence for the necessity of improving corporate governance and preventing systemic risks.