建设工程业主对安全管理者激励模式的设计——基于双重委托代理理论

Designing the Incentive Model for Safety Managers by Construction Owner Based on Double Principal-agent Theory

建设项目中,施工管理人员的安全管理效果直接影响着整个建设项目的生命财产安全,针对我国施工安全管理的现状,基于双重委托代理理论,构建了建设项目中包括业主、施工单位和施工管理者在内的双重代理多任务的委托代理激励模型,定量地研究了安全工作风险、业主的惩罚力度和安全工作绩效对管理者安全工作努力程度的影响.结果表明:风险规避的施工管理者,业主对安全绩效激励系数的增加以及增大的安全工作绩效系数都会促使其安全管理努力水平的增加,然而,安全管理努力水平会随着安全工作风险程度的增大而减小.业主可通过加大对施工管理者安全工作任务的激励系数来激励其更好地进行安全管理工作.研究结论对建设项目的安全管理具有一定的参考价值.

In construction projects, the safety management effectiveness by construction managers directly affects the safety of life and property of the whole construction project. In view of the status quo of construction safety management, this study analyzed the double principal-agent relationship in construction safety management. The double multitask incentive model consisting of owner, contractor and construction managers was constructed. The impact from the safety work risk, owner punishment intensity, safety work performance on the safety managers were analyzed in a quantitative manner. The results showed that the safety management effectiveness would increase with the increasing of safety stimulation coefficient and owner punishment intensity. However, the safety management effectiveness would decrease with an increase of safety work risk. In order to increase the safety work effectiveness, owner can increase the stimulation coefficient of construction managers to improve safety management work effectiveness. The findings of this research can provide solid reference for the safety management of construction projects.