PPP项目竞争性磋商采购效率分析

An Analysis of Procurement Efficiency of Competitive Dialogue for PPP Projects

PPP项目引入竞争性磋商便于政府通过与社会资本方的信息交换明确采购需求,为政府确定合理的项目质量标准提供有效依据.但事前成本的套牢和沉没问题往往导致社会资本方降低采购阶段努力水准从而造成政府采购效率损失,通过构建社会资本方博弈模型分析竞争性磋商对其采购阶段努力水准的激励机制.研究结果表明,政府在竞争性磋商机制中通过信息交换可以有效解决逆向选择问题;通过提升项目质量水平可激励社会资本方在采购阶段付出高努力水准以实现采购效率;但过高的质量水平反而加剧社会资本方竞争从而产生负向激励作用,因此政府需合理控制激励强度以提高采购效率.研究成果以期为政府在PPP项目中合理运用竞争性磋商机制提供借鉴.

Competitive dialogue introduced by PPP projects facilitates the government to clarify procurement demand through information exchange with bidders, and provides an effective basis for the government to determine reasonable project quality standards. However, due to the hold-up and sinking costs, the bidders will reduce effort in procurement stage and thus cause the loss of government procurement efficiency. This paper develops a game model of bidders to investigate the incentive mechanism of effort in competitive dialogue. The results show the government can effectively solve the problem of adverse selection through information exchange in competitive dialogue mechanism. Bidders can be encouraged to pay high level of effort and achieve procurement efficiency by improving the quality level of project, but excessive quality improvement may intensify the competition of bidders and thus generate negative incentives, the government needs to control incentives intensity to improve procurement efficiency. This study is intended to provide a reference for government to properly use competitive dialogue in PPP projects.