基于公平偏好的标准必要专利许可与利益协调

Standard-essential Patents Licensing and Coordination of Inter-organizational Cooperation Based on Fairness Preference

研究了标准必要专利实施过程合作组织间的利益协调问题。设计一个由专利权人(供应商)与专利使用方(制造商)构成的二级供应链,考察专利使用方具有公平偏好时专利许可费的定价博弈与合作利益冲突。研究表明:(1)专利权人主导专利许可费定价可获得高于专利使用方的垄断利润,是产生合作利益冲突的直接原因;(2)专利使用方的公平偏好虽然可以削减专利许可费并增加自身利润,但是也减少了供应链的产量、R&D投入以及整体利润;(3)引入Nash谈判模型的分析发现,协商机制具有显著的利益协调效果,在降低专利许可费的同时使合作双方的利润实现Pareto改进,此时供应链的产量、R&D投入达到集中决策时的最优值水平。研究结论为分析供应链专利许可的利益协调问题提供理论支持。

This study investigates the coordination of inter-organizational cooperation in the process of standard-essential patents(SEPs)licensing.We consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier(patentee)who provides SEPs and a downstream manufacturer(the user of SEPs)who sells products to consumers.Based on the manufacturer's fairness preference,we study the impact of pricing game of patents licensing and the conflict of cooperative organizations.The result shows:(1)The supplier dominates the pricing of patents licensing can obtain the monopoly profit which is higher than the manufacturer,and it becomes the primary cause of supply chain's conflict.(2)The fairness preference of manufacturer can reduce the price of licensing fee and increase its profit,but it also reduce the supply chain's profit,output and R&D investment.(3)By using a Nash bargaining model to simulate the negotiation mechanism of supply chain,we argue that negotiation mechanism has significant coordination effects.Negotiation mechanism can reduce the price of licensing fee,and improve the profits of supplier and manufacturer synchronously,then the output and R&D investment of the supply chain are consistent with the centralized decision context.The main conclusion provides theoretical support for analyzing the coordination of patents licensing in supply chain.