货币政策、银行监督与企业盈余管理

Monetary Policy, Bank Monitoring, and Enterprise Earnings Management

基于2006—2017年A股上市公司数据,检验了货币政策和银行监督对企业盈余管理的影响,研究发现:央行紧缩货币政策时,企业盈余管理程度显著下降;银行监督力度越大,企业盈余管理水平越低,并且紧缩性货币政策显著增强了这种负向关系;进一步研究发现,银行监督对聘请银行背景董事的公司盈余管理仅具有微弱制约作用,而对没有银行背景董事的公司具有显著治理效应。研究不仅丰富了宏观经济政策经济后果和企业盈余管理影响因素等文献,而且对商业银行和企业管理者决策具有参考价值,同时也对公司治理机制优化具有一定启示。

Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2017,the paper examines the influence of monetary policies and bank monitoring on enterprise earnings management. The results show that enterprises’aggressive earnings management decreases significantly when the central bank tightens the monetary policy. Similarly,enterprises are less likely to engage in aggressive earnings management when banks scrutinize closely on their loan process. This effect is further enhanced when combined with a tight monetary policy. Furthermore,bank monitoring can hardly restrict earnings management in enterprises with directors from banks whereas in the enterprises without such directors,bank monitoring significantly restricts earnings management. The study not only contributes to the literature on the economic consequence of macroeconomic policies and on influencing factors of enterprise earnings management,but also provides great value to decision making of managers of commercial banks and other enterprises. It also sheds some light on the optimization of corporate governance mechanism.