快递物流业个人信息隐私保护的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Personal Information Privacy Protection of Express Logistics Industry

[目的/意义]随着电子商务和快递物流业的快速发展,对快递物流业个人信息隐私保护问题的研究具有重要意义。[方法/过程]本文构建快递用户与快递企业之间的演化博弈模型,建立相应的复制动态方程,对快递物流业个人信息隐私保护的演化博弈过程、均衡点与演化参数的稳定性进行探讨,并运用Matlab软件对演化稳定点进行仿真。[结果/结论]结果表明,快递物流业用户与快递企业二者之间策略选择受多种因素的共同影响,其中快递企业泄露用户信息的风险成本、泄露信息获得的额外收益及保护信息成本等因素会影响系统的演化方向及稳定性。最后提出快递物流个人信息隐私保护建议。

[Purpose/Significance]With the rapid development of e-commerce and express logistics industry,it is of great significance to study the privacy protection of personal information in express logistics industry.[Method/Process]Firstly,this paper constructed the evolutionary game model between the express user group and the express enterprise group two groups.Secondly,we established the corresponding replication dynamic equation to discuss the evolution game process,the equilibrium point and the stability of the evolution parameters of the personal information privacy protection of the express logistics industry.Lastly,we used Matlab software to simulate the evolution stable point.[Results/Conclusion]The strategy selection between the express logistics industry and express logistics users was influenced by many factors,among which the risk cost,the extra income and the protection information cost of the express enterprise would affect the evolution direction and stability of the system.Finally,we put forward some suggestions on personal information privacy protection of express logistics.