区块链系统中矿池间的博弈问题及优化

Game Theory among Mining Pools in Blockchain System

区块链中的PoW(工作量证明)共识算法保证了区块链系统的安全性和可靠性。在挖矿期间,矿工之间可以通过PoW算法达成共识。然而除了合作关系,矿工之间是可以互相攻击的,并且矿工可以通过攻击其他矿工增加自己的收益,然而在有矿工选择攻击的情况下,矿池的总收益是会减少的。我们将区块链系统中各矿工选择攻击与合作的问题建立成一个博弈论模型,并以宏观的角度分析,以矿池为单位进行研究,对目前常用的策略进行了比较,并在此基础上提出了一种定值策略,它可以更好地解决各个矿池选择合作还是攻击的困境,从而提高全网的总收益。总的来说,我们从博弈论的角度对区块链系统中各矿池可选择的策略进行了剖析,为进一步设计基于博弈论的共识算法提供新的思路和方法。

The PoW (workload proof) consensus algorithm in the blockchain guarantees the security and reliability of the blockchain system. During mining period, miners may reach a consensus through the PoW algorithm. However, apart from the cooperative relationship, miners can attack each others, and increase their profits by attacking other miners. However, when miners choose to attack, the total profits of the mining pool would decrease. This paper proposes a game theory model for each miner’s choice of attack or cooperation in the blockchain system, and analyzes it from a macropoint of view, discusses the mining pool as a unit, compares the commonly-used strategies at present, and puts forward a setting strategy on this basis, which can be used to fairly solve the dilemma of choosing cooperation or attack by each mining pool, thus improving the total revenue of the whole system. Generally, speaking, from the point of view of game theory, this paper analyzes the strategies that can be chosen by each mining pool in the blockchain system, and provides new ideas and methods for further design of consensus algorithm base on the game theory.