京津冀地方财政面临的溢出效应:基于动态空间面板模型的实证研究

Spillover Effect on Fiscal Policy of Local Governments in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region:An Empirical Study Based on Dynamic Spatial Panel Model

地方财政面临溢出效应,体现为某一地方政府的财政收支规模会受到周边地区政府财政收支规模的横向影响。本文在深入剖析地方财政溢出效应形成机制的基础上,基于京津冀地区2008—2015年区县级面板数据,利用动态空间面板模型和全局莫兰指数,实证分析京津冀区县政府公共财政的溢出效应。研究发现:1)京津冀各区县的财政支出面临周边区县财政支出的正向溢出效应,周边区县如果扩大财政支出规模,为避免在"晋升锦标赛"中处于劣势,本地政府会加大财政支出力度; 2)地方财政支出需要财政收入来支撑,京津冀区县政府间围绕财政支出的横向竞争会传导到各区县财政收入决策,京津冀各区县的财政收入面临周边区县财政收入的正向"溢出效应"。

The spillover effect of local fiscal policy is reflected in the fact that the scale of fiscal revenue and expenditure of a local government will be affected by the scale of fiscal revenue and expenditure of surrounding areas.Based on the in-depth analysis of the formation mechanism of local fiscal spillover effect and the district/county level panel data of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei(BTH)region from 2008 to 2015,the spillover effect of fiscal policy of district/county governments in BTH region are empirically analyzed by using the dynamic spatial panel(DSP)model and the global Moran’s I index.It is found that:1)The fiscal expenditures of districts/counties in BTH region face the positive“spillover effect”of fiscal expenditure of the surrounding districts/counties.If the surrounding districts/counties expand the scale of fiscal expenditures,the local government will increase its fiscal expenditures as response in order to avoid disadvantages in the“promotional championship”.2)Local fiscal expenditure needs to be supported by fiscal revenue.The horizontal competition around the fiscal expenditures of the BTH district/county governments will be transmitted to the fiscal revenue decision-making of districts/counties in the region.The fiscal revenues of districts/counties in BTH region face the positive“spillover effect”from the surrounding districts/counties.