反垄断法中罚款数额的影响因素与实证检验——基于我国反垄断法实施十年的数据

Influencing Factors and Empirical Test of the Penalty Amount in Anti-Monopoly Law——Based on the past Ten Years' Data since the implementation of China's Anti-Monopoly Law

反垄断法实施十年来,罚款已经成为反垄断执法最常见、最重要的手段。近年来,反垄断罚款数额屡创新高,执法力度日益增强,但各界也对罚款数额产生了一些质疑,认为存在严重的"以罚代没""选择性执法""一刀切"问题。基于2008至2018年我国反垄断机构查处484个行政案件,通过实证分析发现:反垄断执法中没收违法所得与罚款两种手段存在"以罚代没"的情形;垄断企业的产权性质并不会左右最终罚款比例的确定,几乎不存在"选择性执法";对横向垄断协议行为的罚款比例高于其他垄断行为,但行业协会的参与并未加重垄断严重程度。在反垄断法的修订中,应明确影响罚款的合理裁量因素及其对应的罚款比例,以实现反垄断执法的公平与效率。

In the past ten years since the implementation of the anti-monopoly law, fines have become the most common and important means of anti-monopoly law enforcement. In recent years, with the increasing amount of anti-monopoly fines and the enforcement of law, some doubts about the amount of fines are arisen in the society that there are serious problems of “penalty instead of confiscation”,“one-size-fits-all” and “selective law enforcement.” Based on empirical analysis of 484 administrative cases investigated and dealt with by China's anti-monopoly agencies from 2008 to 2018: In the anti-monopoly law enforcement, the confiscation of illegal income and fines has the possibility of “no penalty;” The property rights of monopoly enterprises will not determine the final penalty ratio, and there is almost no “selective law enforcement.” The proportion of fines for horizontal monopoly agreements is higher than other monopolistic behaviors, but the participation of industry associations does not increase the severity of monopoly. In the revision of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the reasonable discretionary factors affecting the fine and the corresponding fines should be clarified to achieve the fairness and efficiency of anti-monopoly law enforcement.