融券卖空、分析师跟踪与企业信息披露质量

Short Selling Mechanism,Analyst Tracking and Quality of Enterprise Information Disclosure

分析师跟踪和卖空机制的信息挖掘是投资者获取企业信息的重要渠道。在分析师存在乐观偏差的情况下,卖空投资者专注于负面信息的挖掘功能如能弥补分析师偏差的不足,对于提高企业信息披露质量会具有重要意义。针对我国2010年开始实施的融券卖空试点外生事件,运用双重差分方法实证研究在企业信息存在偏差情况下卖空机制的负面信息挖掘功能与分析师跟踪的关系及其对企业信息披露质量的影响。研究发现:在存在分析师乐观偏差时,卖空机制可以促进企业负面信息披露,纠正分析师偏差的影响,弥补分析师跟踪不足的缺陷,从而提高企业信息披露质量;但在分析师无乐观偏差时,卖空机制并不能提高企业信息披露质量。

Information mining by analyst tracking and short selling are important channels for investors to obtain corporate information. In the case of analysts with optimistic bias, short-selling investors focusing on negative information mining functions can make up for the lack of analyst bias,which is of great significance for improving the quality of corporate information disclosure. Based on the exogenous events of the pilot short selling implemented in 2010 in China,this paper uses DID method to empirically study the relationship between the negative information mining function of the short selling and the analyst tracking in the case of the deviation of enterprise information,and the impact on the quality of corporate information disclosure. The study finds that short selling mechanism can promote negative information disclosure,correct the impact of analyst bias,make up for the shortcomings of analyst tracking,and improve the quality of corporate information disclosure when analyst optimistic bias exists. However,when the analyst has no optimistic bias,short selling mechanism can not improve the quality of information disclosure.