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一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值 被引量:2

A Two-Step Shapley Value for a Kind of Cooperative Games with Restricted Coalition Structure
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摘要 讨论一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策,其中局中人通过优先联盟整体参与大联盟的合作,同时优先联盟内部有合取权限结构限制,利用两阶段Shapley值的分配思想并考虑到权限结构对优先联盟内合作的限制,给出了此类合作对策的解。该解可看做具有联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值的推广。证明了该解满足的公理化条件,并验证了这些条件的独立性。 A kind of cooperative games with restricted coalition structure are discussed, in which players participate in the cooperation of the grand coalition through the priori unions as a whole and there are conjunctive permission structures within the priori unions. A solution to this kind of cooperative games is given by using the two-step Shapley value distribution idea and taking into account the limits of permission structure on cooperation within the priori unions. This solution can be seen as a generalization of the two-step Shapley value for games with coalition structures. The axiomatization conditions of the solution are proved, and the independence of these conditions is verified.
作者 王利明 WANG Li-ming(School of Statistics and Mathematics, Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics, Hohhot 010070, China;Inner Mongolia key laboratory of economic data analysis and mining, Hohhot 010070, China)
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2019年第5期56-60,共5页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771025,71661024,71561022) 内蒙古自然科学基金资助项目(2017MS0715)
关键词 合作对策 联盟结构 权限结构 两阶段Shapley值 cooperative game coalition structure permission structure two-step Shapley value
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