分阶段风险投资中再谈判行为与道德风险问题

The Issue of Renegotiation and Moral Hazard Instaged Venture Investment

探讨了分阶段风险投资中创业企业面对不完全资本市场和风投公司面对道德风险及不确定性时的模型,分析了分阶段投资在模型中作用。在对比初期一次性投资和分阶段投资后,结合再谈判行为的特性,发现了一些有意义的结论:不管在第二阶段有没有再谈判行为,随着创业企业努力成本的提升,风投公司的利润水平在分阶段投资时会接近最优情况。不管在第二阶段有没有再谈判行为,随着创业企业努力成本的提升,分阶段投资中的努力水平(无论次优方案还是最优方案)都要高于初期一次性投资中的努力水平,并且次优方案中的努力水平会接近最优方案中的努力水平。对创业企业来讲,当第二阶段没有再谈判行为时,所有情况(次优方案和最优方案)下的最优股权都相同;当存在再谈判行为时,次优股权分配要高于最优股权分配。通过对创业板上市公司公布数据的实证分析,也验证了以上结论的正确性。

This paper discusses the model of venture capital in the face of incomplete capital market and venture capital in the face of moral hazard and uncertainty,and analyzes the role of venture capital in the model.After comparing the initial one-time investment and phased investment,and combining the characteristics of renegotiation behavior,some meaningful conclusions are found:with or without the renegotiation behavior in the second stage,with the increase of effort cost of start-up enterprises,the profit level of venture capital companies will approach the optimal situation in the phased investment. No matter whether there is renegotiation in the second stage or not,with the increase of effort cost of the start-up enterprise,the effort level in the phased investment(no matter the sub-optimal plan or the optimal plan) is higher than that in the initial one-time investment,and the effort level in the sub-optimal plan is close to that in the optimal plan.For start-ups,when there is no renegotiation in the second stage,the optimal equity in all cases(the second best and the best)is the same.When there is renegotiation behavior,the sub-optimal equity allocation is higher than the optimal equity allocation.Through the empirical analysis of the data released by listed companies on GEM,the above conclusions are also verified.