土地资源的产权交易与腐败

Corruption and the Equity Transaction of Land Resources

自然资源领域是我国经济转轨过程中的腐败重灾区之一。基于寻租理论,文章提出自然资源富集加剧腐败的两个前提条件,即自然资源的稀缺和产权交易非完全市场化。不同于其他国家,我国的土地资源在城市化快速发展的过程中稀缺性日益凸显,所有城市土地为国家所有,协议出让与"招拍挂"出让并存,因此符合诱发腐败的两个前提条件,其产权交易过程蕴含更大的腐败风险。文章采用2003~2016年省级面板数据构建双向固定效应模型进行实证检验,并使用系统广义矩估计法进行稳健性检验。实证结果显示,我国土地资源产权交易额越多的省份,腐败程度越严重,这种影响在城市化水平较高的地区更为显著。

Equity transactions of natural resources are one of the worst problems of corruption during China's economic transition. Based on the theory of rent-seeking, this study puts forward two prerequisites of the scarcity and the incomplete marketization of equity transaction which may exacerbate corruption by the enrichment of natural resources. Different from other countries, in China resources are becoming increasingly scarce in the process of rapid urbanization. At the same time, all urban land in China is owned by the state, and the agreement transfer coexists with the " bidding and auction" transfer. China's land resources are in line with the two prerequisites, and its equity transaction process leads to greater risk of corruption. Based on the provincial panel data from 2003 to 2016, this study constructs a two-way fixed effects model for empirical testing, and uses the system GMM to conduct robustness tests. It verifies that the provinces with more land equity transactions in China have more corruption. This effect is more pronounced in areas with higher levels of urbanization.