道德责任的根据——试析叔本华对道德责任之基础的重构

Grounds for Moral Responsibility——An Analysis of Schopenhauer’s Reconstruction of the Basis of Moral Responsibility

道德责任的根据问题一直以来都是一个倍受哲学家们关注的问题。叔本华并不认同将自由意志作为道德责任之基础的观点。一方面,他认为所谓的自由意志是根本不存在的,因为人的意志本身也要遵循普遍的因果规律;另一方面,道德责任不能以自由为基础,而只能以必然性为基础。必然性在人这里体现为性格,所以道德责任必须以性格为基础。从叔本华性格观的具体内涵分析可以发现,叔本华顶多是找到了确认行为主体道德责任的依据,但他还远没有达到为道德责任奠基的目的;此外,他的性格观消解了人的道德责任,抹杀了人与动物的区别。性格是一个包含理性、情感和意志等多种心理要素的复杂的有机系统。其中,理性的权衡功能恰恰是理解自由意志的关键。叔本华由于没有意识到性格系统的这一复杂性,所以其理论陷入了自相矛盾的境地。叔本华的困境也为相反的立场留下了空间,即,道德责任必须以自由意志为根据。

The basis of moral responsibility has always been a philosophical issue of great concern to philosophers. Schopenhauer does not agree with the view that free will is the basis of moral responsibility. On the one hand, he thinks that the so-called free will does not exist, because human will itself follow the universal law of cause and effect. On the other hand, moral responsibility cannot be based on freedom, but only on necessity.Since inevitability is embodied in character here, moral responsibility must be based on character.Through the analysis of the concrete connotation of Schopenhauer’s view of character, it is found that Schopenhauer at most found the basis of confirming the moral responsibility of the behavior subject, but he failed to lay the foundation for the moral responsibility. Moreover, his view of personality will eliminate the moral responsibility of human beings objectively and wipe out the fundamental difference between human beings and animals. Personality is a complex organic system which includes many psychological elements such as reason, emotion and will. Among them, the function of weight of reason is the key to understanding free will. It is Schopenhauer did not realize the complexity of personality system that his theory fell into a contradiction. Schopenhauer’s dilemma on the basis of moral responsibility also leaves room for the opposite position, namely, that moral responsibility must be based on free will.