摘要
伴随基层民主政治的不断发展,民主选举已成为村民行使民主权利、参与村庄治理的重要途径。然而,受乡村利益关系及文化因素的影响,不少地方的村庄选举中出现了村干部共谋行为。本文以山东省S村换届选举为例,对村干部选举共谋事件中的宗族关系、权力制衡与乡镇政府行为做了分析。研究发现,村干部选举共谋行为对村庄民主发展和村庄治理产生了不良影响,包括堵塞年轻精英进入村庄治理的渠道,削弱自治组织的治理权威,恶化村庄治理的整体环境。村干部选举共谋行为的产生是传统与现代、正式和非正式规则交互作用的结果,其对内表现出高度的复杂性,对外则具有相当的排斥性,虽产生于选举过程,却作用于村庄治理的长期实践,必须加以重视。从根本上说,遏制村干部选举共谋行为需要从内外两方面着手:一是要增强乡村社会自身的制衡能力,发展壮大村民自组织,以有组织的村民群体牵制少数几个村干部的联合行动;二是要增强外部权威的依法监督和干预,提高违法成本。
With the continuous development of grassroots democratic politics,democratic election has become an important way for villagers to exercise their democratic rights and participate in rural governance.However,due to the influence of rural interests and cultural factors,there has been a phenomenon of election collusion among village cadres in many places.In the acquaintance society,interests are the driving forces behind the election collusion among village cadres,and private contacts provide the way for village cadres to reach election collusion.The election collusion among village cadres is closely related to the village power structure.It is a realistic expression of village politics and its existence has certain reasonability as well.Village cadres who adopt legal election collusion behaviors means that the village has a good political ecology.But illegal election collusion has a very negative impact.It is well-known that the results of election will ultimately influence village governance.Studying the relationship between village election and governance is important for both democratic practice and theoretical development.Taking the election of S village in Shandong Province as an example,this paper inspires a new thought of linking village specific phenomena to village governance,and analyzes the clan relationship,power balance and township behavior in the election collusion among village cadres.The study finds that the election collusion among village cadres has adverse effects on rural democratic development and governance.Cadre’s election collusion behaviors may block young elites’access to rural governance,weaken the authority of autonomous organizations and worsen the overall environment of rural governance.The emergence of cadres’election collusion is the result of interaction between traditional and modern,formal and informal rules.It demonstrates a high degree of complexity in the interior and is quite exclusive to the outside world.Although it originates in the electoral process,it has a long-term practice in rural governance.Therefore,it is difficult to eliminate its adverse effects by relying solely on external intervention force or internal check and balance mechanism.Fundamentally speaking,it is necessary to curb the cadres’election collusion behaviors both inside and outside.Firstly,strengthen the internal supervision and balance ability of villagers'self-organization.Secondly,lift the illegal cost by strengthening legal supervision and intervention of external authorities.
出处
《中国农村观察》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期97-108,共12页
China Rural Survey
关键词
村庄选举
村干部共谋
村庄治理
乡土规则
乡镇政府行动
Village Election
Village Cadres Collusion
Rural Governance
Rural Regulation
Township GovernmentAction