国家审计、高管隐性腐败和公司创新投入——基于国家审计公告的研究

National Audit,Implicit Corruption and Corporate Innovation Investment:A Study Based on the National Audit Reports

基于审计署发布的国家审计公告,以国有上市公司为样本,研究国家审计行为及审计公告揭示力度对企业创新投入的促进作用。研究发现:首先,国家审计行为能够促进被审计央企的创新投入强度,同时国家审计公告揭示的违规问题越严重,对被审计央企创新投入程度的促进作用越强,且促进作用在高管隐性腐败程度高的公司中更为显著;其次,与单次审计相比,二次审计对创新投入强度的促进作用并无显著差异;最后,国家审计对创新投入强度的促进作用在同行业国企中有一定的传染效应。

Based on the National Audit Reports,this paper takes state-owned listed companies as a sample,and studies the effect of national audit on corporate innovation investment and finds:firstly,national audit can promote corporate innovation investment of central-owned companies,and the more serious the violations revealed by the national audit announcements are, the stronger the promotion of corporate innovation investment by national audit is,especially in the central-owned companies with higher management implicit corruption;secondly,compared to the single national audit,repeating audit has no a significant difference in promoting the innovation input;finally,there is an industry contagion effect of national audit on the corporate innovation investment.