审计意见、企业投资与实物期权价值——基于我国证券市场的经验证据

Audit Opinion,Enterprise Investment and Real Option Value:Empirical Evidence Based on China’s Securities Market

以2009-2017年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究对象,运用实物期权理论,在审计意见与企业投资活动的基础上考察审计意见对实物期权价值的影响,进一步探讨了审计意见的监督和信号传递功能对企业未来价值的影响。研究发现,审计意见传递负面信号时,增强融资约束,降低企业投资支出规模,并通过抑制投资过度提高投资效率;进一步研究发现,在衡量企业增长期权价值时,企业有较高盈利能力时,审计意见所传递的正面信号能显著增加企业的增长期权。同时,在衡量企业清算期权价值时,审计意见所传递的正面信号则能显著增加盈利能力较差企业的清算期权。这为审计意见具有提升企业未来价值进而促进提高社会经济资源的配置效率之功能与作用提供了经验证据。

Taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2017 as the research object,this paper uses the theory of real options to investigate the impact of audit opinions on the value of real options on the basis of audit opinions and enterprise investment activities,and further discusses the impact of the supervision and signal transmission function of audit opinions on the future value of enterprises. It is found that when the audit opinions send negative signals,the financing constraints are strengthened,the scale of investment expenditure is reduced,and the investment efficiency is improved by restraining excessive investment. Further research shows that when the value of enterprise growth options is measured and the enterprise has a high profitability,the positive signal delivered by the audit opinion can significantly increase the enterprise growth options. At the same time,when measuring the value of enterprise liquidation options,the positive signal conveyed by the audit opinion can significantly increase the liquidation options of enterprises with a poor profitability. This provides empirical evidence for the role of audit opinions in enhancing the future value of enterprises,and thus promoting the efficiency of allocation of social and economic resources.