实体企业金融化与审计定价:投入补偿还是风险补偿

Financialization of Non-financial Enterprises and Audit Pricing:Input Compensation or Risk Compensation

结合我国实体企业"产融结合"和"脱实向虚"共存的现状,验证实体企业金融化对审计定价的影响及其内部作用机制。研究结果发现:实体企业金融化导致审计定价提升。其作用机制主要体现在,金融资产配置使得审计工作的复杂程度增加,行业内特定知识和审计经验的积累促使行业专长较强的注册会计师更加倾向于借助提高审计定价来获取投入补偿。同时,在一般状态下,金融资产配置形成的风险机制对审计定价缺乏调整能力。具体表现为,当被审计客户重要性程度较低时,注册会计师倾向于通过提升审计定价实现风险补偿;伴随被审计客户重要性程度增加,审计定价中的风险补偿部分逐渐消失。研究结果表明,金融资产收益较强的波动性和较差的持续性特征导致企业整体业绩波动形成的风险并未在审计定价中完全体现,审计师对不同重要性程度的客户投资金融资产形成的风险存在认知差异。

According to the audit insurance hypothesis,audit fee is the important economic relation between accounting firms and public companies. This paper examines the relationship between financialization of non-financial enterprises and audit pricing. The results show that financialization leads to an increase in audit pricing. The mechanism that drives the result is as follows:with the increasing financialization of non - financial enterprises,audit work becomes more complex,as a result, industry specialist auditors will charge higher audit fees to cover the audit costs they spend without asking for the risk compensation. But when client bargaining power is low,the auditors tend to charge risk compensation,which vanishes as the client bargaining power grows. The results indicate that financialization leads to an increase in audit pricing,and audit fees mainly represent audit input compensation rather than risk compensation.