问询函监管与大股东“掏空”——来自沪深交易所年报问询的证据

Inquiry Letters Supervision and Tunneling of Controlling Shareholders:Evidence from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange of Annual Report Inquiry

基于沪深交易所问询函监管的重要政策,以2013-2017年中国A股上市公司和年报问询函数据为样本,考察问询函监管对大股东"掏空"行为的治理效应。研究发现,中国式问询函监管有效抑制大股东"掏空"行为;进一步将问询函区分为包含"掏空"关键事项问询函和未包含"掏空"关键事项问询函,发现问询函监管对大股东"掏空"行为的抑制作用主要体现在包含"掏空"关键事项问询函上。从大股东实施"掏空"行为动机看,"掏空"关键事项问询函对大股东"掏空"行为的抑制作用在内部控制治理水平较差的公司中更强。从大股东"掏空"行为实现的客观条件来看,"掏空"关键事项问询函对大股东"掏空"行为的治理效应在法治水平较低地区更显著。

Based on the policy of inquiry letters from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Taking Chinese Ashare listed firms from 2013 to 2017 as our samples,this paper investigates the governance effect of inquiry letters supervision on controlling shareholders' tunneling behavior. The empirical results show that the regulatory of enquiry letters can effectively restrain the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders. The inquiry letters are further divided into tunneling-related inquiry letters and non-tunneling-related inquiry letters,and we find that the supervision effect of inquiry letters on controlling shareholders'tunneling is more pronounced in tunneling-related inquiry letters. From the motivation of controlling shareholders to conduct tunneling,the supervision effect of tunneling-related inquiry letters on controlling shareholders' tunneling is stronger in the companies with poor internal control. From the objective conditions of the realization of tunneling behavior,the governance effect of tunneling-related inquiry letters on controlling shareholders'tunneling is more significant in the regions with lower legal level.