考虑声誉的微政务信息公开质量监管研究

Research on Quality Supervision of Micro-Government Information Disclosure Considering Reputation

新时代下我国社会主要矛盾的历史性变化对微政务信息公开质量提出了更高的要求。文章基于声誉视角,构建了微政务信息公开质量监管的演化博弈模型,并使用MATLAB进行了实证研究。研究表明,在未考虑声誉的情况下,供给者往往会选择提供低质量的微政务信息;在考虑声誉的情况下,当声誉转换水平较高时,可以有效促进供给者提供高质量的微政务信息。因此,管理者应该重视声誉机制的建设,以鼓励供给者不断提供高质量微政务信息。

In the new era, the historic change of social principal contradiction in China has put forward higher requirements for the quality of micro-government information disclosure. The paper builds an evolutionary game model for quality supervision of micro-government information disclosure from the perspective of reputation, and conducts an empirical study with MATLAB. The research shows that suppliers often choose to provide low-quality micro-government information without considering reputation. In the case of considering reputation, the high level reputation conversion can effectively promote suppliers to provide high-quality micro-government information. Therefore, managers should pay attention to the construction of reputation mechanism to encourage suppliers to continuously provide high-quality information.