摘要
在铁路客运公共服务快速升级过程中,利益配置的天平有从普通公众转向国家、地方政府和高收入群体的倾向。在快速升级的过程中,体制内单位公信力的耗损具有全流程化、反复化特征,"塔西佗陷阱"初现端倪。在投资驱动型经济增长模式下,利益配置失衡是体制内单位公信力耗损的主因。基于国情,可以通过调整投融资结构和社会目标约束,解决相关问题。
In the process of rapid upgrading of railway passenger transport, the balance of interest allocation has a tendency to shift from the general public to the national, local government, and high-income groups;those events which deteriorate public trust run through all stages of the construction and operation of the high-speed railway, and the Tacitus trap emerged;under the government-led investment-driven economic growth model, the main reason to deterioration of public trust of in-system unit lies in the imbalance of benefit allocation. Finally, in light of China’s national conditions, this paper proposes to solve related problems by adjusting the structure of investment and financing and the constraints of social goals.
作者
刘春济
LIU Chun-ji(School of Business,Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234,China)
出处
《陕西行政学院学报》
2019年第2期5-10,共6页
Journal of Shaanxi Academy of Governance
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"中国的长期经济发展:政府治理与制度演进的视角"(14WJL008)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"公众乘坐高铁旅行的意向研究:影响因素
作用机理与政策建议"(14YJCZH093)
关键词
公共服务升级
利益配置失衡
体制内单位
公信力
高铁
rapid upgrade of public services
imbalance of interest allocation
in-system unit
public trust
high-speed rail