“短贷长投”是企业的被迫行为吗?——基于管理者过度自信的视角

Is “Maturity Mismatch” a Forced Behavior of Enterprises? ——A Perspective Based on Managers Overconfidence

企业“短贷长投”加大了金融风险,并对企业绩效产生了负向影响。本文从行为财务学角度入手,考察管理者过度自信这类主观因素对“短贷长投”的影响。首先,利用“投资—非理性短期借款”敏感性模型,证实了中国上市公司“短贷长投”问题普遍存在;其次,实证研究表明,金融制度缺陷对“短贷长投”未产生显著影响,而管理者过度自信这类主观因素则显著加剧了“短贷长投”;进一步研究表明,银行流动资金贷款管理水平的提高能够削弱管理者过度自信对“短贷长投”的影响。由此,要切实解决企业“短贷长投”问题,不仅要改善当前金融制度环境,更要抑制管理者的非理性行为。

The maturity mismatch of investment and financing not only aggravates the systemic financial risk,but also has a negative impact on the performance of enterprises.Unlike the existing research which mainly focuses on finding out the reasons from the“institutional factors”,this paper examines how the“human factors”,like managers over confidence,affect the investment and financing maturity mismatch from the perspective of behavioral finance.It first proves that the maturity mismatch of investment and financing is acommon phenomenon,and then conductsan empirical study which finds no evidence to support the role of“institutional factors”.but shows that the“human factors”,such as managers over confidence,significantly exacerbate the maturity mismatch of investment and financing.Besides,the improvement of bank liquidity loan management can weaken the influence of managers overconfidence on the maturity mismatch.