基于CVaR准则的资金约束供应链回购契约协调策略

Coordination Strategy of Buyback Contract in Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Based on CVaR Criterion

选取单阶段的风险厌恶且资金约束的供应链系统为研究背景,在随机市场需求假设下,资金约束的零售商采取从银行贷款的融资方式时,应用CVaR风险度量准则计算有资金约束零售商的最优订货量,并讨论作为供应链主导企业的供应商采取回购契约对供应链进行协调时回购契约参数满足的条件。结果表明:风险厌恶因子并不影响回购契约中回购参数大小的设定,但会影响供应链系统分散和集中决策时的最优订货量;资金约束风险厌恶的零售商所在的供应链系统中,集中决策的订货量和供应链利润仍大于分散决策时的订货量和供应链利润。另外,零售商的初始资金和贷款利率会影响供应商的期望利润,此时供应商可以通过调节回购契约中的回购比例实现供应链的协调。

A capital-constrained supply chain with a supplier and a risk-averse retailer is considered in the paper. The retailer faces a nonnegative random demand and the bank applies the loan to the risk-averse retailer with budget constraints. Different from the existing research, in a conditional value-at-risk(CVaR) framework, the optimal strategies of the retailer and the supplier are obtained. To coordinate the supply chain, the supplier, as the leader, provides the buyback contract and shares the market risk of the retailer. The results show that the risk-averse factor of the retailer has no effect on the buyback parameter but can influence the optimal level of the supply chain system with centralized and decentralization decision. The optimal ordering and the profit of the centralized decision supply chain are larger than those with the decentralized decision supply chain. In addition, the initial funds and the loaning rate of the retailer will decrease the expected profit of the supply. At this time, the supplier can regulate the buy-back parameter to realize the coordination of the supply chain.