顺水巧推舟:顶级财务顾问专业能力的并购市场证据

The Smartness of Top Financial Advisors in Catering to Client's Requirement:Evidence from China's M&A Market

本文证明了声誉较好的顶级财务顾问会根据不同的客户目标,因事制宜地发挥其专业能力。具体的,本文发现当机会主义客户追求完成并购计划以实施买壳上市,获得增发资格或保壳时,顶级财务顾问的作用主要体现在提升并购完成率方面;而当非机会主义客户追求更优的并购绩效时,顶级财务顾问的作用主要体现在提升并购绩效方面。本文的证据倾向于支持顶级财务顾问具有更为出色的专业能力,并发现客户目标会显著影响顶级财务顾问专业能力优势的发挥方向,从而为并购市场财务顾问能力问题的争论,提供一个统一性的解释可能。然而,站在社会福利的角度,顶级财务顾问帮助提高了机会主义并购的成功率,这会对社会资源的有效配置造成负面的影响。

This paper provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that top M&A financial advisors are very good at helping clients either perform better after M&A or enhance the certainty of completing a M&A transaction, depending on each client's specific requirem ent. We divide financial advisor's clients into opportunists and non-opportunists. The former seeks to get listed through reverse m erger, obtain refinancing qualification or protect listed shell and they pay more attention to the certainty of completing a M&A transaction than to the post-M&A perform ance, while the latter prefers better post-M&A performance to higher certainty of completing a M&A transaction. Our evidence implies that top financial advisors of non-opportunists are more able to help clients perform better after M&A and help opportunist clients enhance the certainty of completing a M&A transaction. T herefore, we unify the existing debatable literature on the role of top financial advisors by introducing clients* requirem ent as a variable.