破产法视域下董事义务的二重性思辨

The Duality of Directors’ Obligations Under the Scope of Bankruptcy Law

素有信托基金理论、风险负担理论解决事实破产期间债权人直接向董事问责的理论基础问题,董事义务二重性的独特品格却是隐藏在理论之争背后的隐形共识,并且能够发挥避免学说争论、创设董事义务新类型的功能,尤其是为公司债权人向董事问责提供法律解释的空间。我国现行立法对债权人向董事直接问责的情形限于资本维持义务、破产撤销制度,为强化董事在事实破产期间履职责任,有必要以《企业破产法》第125条第1款为中心,对董事损害债权人利益的情形进行解释补强,以加强公司法与破产法在董事责任方面的互动,同时我国不宜建立商业判断规则,应以违法性边界作为董事勤勉义务的审查标准。

It is the theory of trust fund theory and risk burden theory to solve the theoretical basis of the creditor s direct accountability to directors during the actual bankruptcy.The unique character of the duality of directors duties is the hidden consensus hidden behind the theoretical dispute,and can play a role in avoiding academic arguments.Create a new type of functional role for directors,especially to provide legal space for corporate creditors to provide accountability to directors.China s current legislation is limited to the creditor s direct accountability to the directors.It is limited to the capital maintenance obligation and the bankruptcy revocation system.In order to strengthen the performance of directors performance of duties during the actual bankruptcy,it is necessary to focus on Article 125,paragraph 1,of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.Explain and strengthen the situation in which the directors harm the creditors interests,and strengthen the interaction between the company law and the bankruptcy law in terms of directors responsibilities.At the same time,it is not appropriate for China to establish business judgment rules.The illegal borders should be used as the review criteria for directors diligence obligations.