摘要
博弈论在多大程度上可从严格的贝叶斯式理论或决策论的角度推演出来,是获得统一的实践理性理论的唯一途径。但实际上并不存在这样的推演。博弈论中混杂相间的行动理性和认知理性有严格区分。认知理性的议题正如它们在博弈论中被假设的那样,亦如它们在贝叶斯博弈学习过程中所涉及的那样,它们是独立的,需要在博弈论中得到清晰的考虑,并着手解释局中人的主观概率。
The paper examines the extent to which game theory can be derived from a strictly Bayesian or decision theoretic point of view,since this is the only way to gain a unified theory of practical rationality.It observes that no such derivation exists and criticizes the standard arguments for the rationality of equilibrium strategies in two-person zero-sum games.It then proposes the beginnings of the theory or rationalizability(as it has been called later on)and observes its restrictions.It continues with pleading for a strict distinction of action rationality and epistemic rationality(which are confounded in game theory).The final critical discussion of Harsanyi’s stance concludes that issues of epistemic rationality are independent and need to be explicitly considered in game theory and proposes to explain the subjective probabilities of the players,as they are assumed in game theory,as evolving in Bayesian game learning processes.
出处
《哲学分析》
CSSCI
2019年第3期131-155,199,共26页
Philosophical Analysis
关键词
博弈论
贝叶斯理论
决策论
行动理性
认知理性
game theory
Bayesian theory
decision theory
action rationality
epistemic rationality